BICOM

Key Points

 

• Israel’s operation in Gaza has made it impossible to ignore the strategic situation in the region. The Middle East is currently divided between an alliance of pro-western states, including Israel and Egypt, and a rival bloc centred on Iran, which includes Hamas.

• The role of Egypt in the last weeks is a product of this reality. Egypt took the initiative in convening Arab and European leaders at a summit in Sharm al Sheikh on Sunday, in an effort to begin the process of turning the shaky unilateral ceasefires of Israel and Hamas into a more permanent arrangement. 

• The presence of Prime Minister Gordon Brown in Sharm al Sheikh, alongside the prime ministers of the Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Spain and Turkey, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, was testimony to the importance the international community attaches to restoring stability and preventing Hamas re-arming in Gaza. 

• The military doctrine of ‘muqawama’ (resistance) pioneered by Iran and its allies demonstrated its limits in the recent fighting in Gaza. Hamas’s misreading of the balance of capabilities between itself and Israel have led to the movement (and by association the regional alliance of which it forms a part) suffering a significant setback in Gaza.      

Introduction

 

At 2am on Sunday, January 18, Israeli forces began to implement a unilateral ceasefire in Gaza.  In announcing the ceasefire, Prime Minister Olmert noted that Israel had attained its objectives in Operation Cast Lead.  Hamas responded a few hours later with a unilateral ceasefire declaration of its own. The announcement of the ceasefires by no means indicates that long-term tranquility is about to descend on Gaza and southern Israel, but it does mark the successful conclusion of the IDF operation. Israel’s determination to challenge Hamas has certainly come at a very high cost, particularly in loss of civilian life on the Palestinian side. This document will look at its broader geo-political implications and will then go on to consider the possible strategic implications.

Potential geo-political implications

 

Operation Cast Lead has cast considerable light on the strategic alignment in the region.  The region is currently divided between an alliance of pro-western states, including Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and a rival bloc centred on Iran, which includes Syria, Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas among the Palestinians. The pro-Iranian alliance is committed to the destruction of Israel as a strategic goal. The tendency to see the last few weeks of fighting as another round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a simplification. Operation Cast Lead was first and foremost a clash between two members of these rival regional alliances.

The role of Egypt during the fighting has been a product of this reality. The Egyptians watched the emergence of a pro-Iranian statelet in Gaza with particular trepidation in the last two years. The main opposition to the ruling regime in Cairo is the Muslim Brotherhood movement, of which Hamas is the Palestinian branch. As such, the emergence of an independent base for this movement in Gaza was of grave concern. It is clear that the Egyptians were made aware of the impending IDF operation in Gaza. Egypt played a tactical role of primary importance in the fighting, by refusing to respond to Hamas requests to open the Rafah Crossing. 

The Egyptian refusal to budge on this issue led to a furious and unprecedented condemnation of the Cairo government by Iran and its supporters. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah broke all previous rhetorical boundaries when he called for an uprising by the Egyptian people against the government to force the opening of the crossing.[1] The Hezbollah leader’s statement, and Egyptian President Mubarak’s pressure on Hamas to accept a ceasefire or face the destruction of their regime in Gaza have been noted across the region. Criticism of Egypt in the Arab media and in demonstrations has been particularly intense, testifying to the widespread popularity of the Muqawama (resistance) doctrine among the publics of the Arab states.     

The diplomatic spat in the Gulf over the weekend, in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia sought to prevent Qatar from holding an emergency Arab summit to discuss the Gaza issue also derives from the clash of regional blocs surrounding the events in Gaza. Egypt and Saudi Arabia consider Qatar to be excessively sympathetic to Iran and Hamas. While both Cairo and Riyadh have made the usual public criticisms of Israel, (as well as less common public criticism of Hamas), neither country wanted to allow Qatar a platform from which it could try to obligate Arab states to take practical measures against Israel.[2]

Egypt took the initiative in convening Arab and European leaders at a summit in Sharm al Sheikh on Sunday, in an effort to begin the process of turning the shaky unilateral ceasefires of Israel and Hamas into a more permanent arrangement. The presence of Prime Minister Gordon Brown in Sharm al Sheikh, alongside the prime ministers of the Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Spain and Turkey, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, was testimony to the importance the international community attaches to restoring stability and preventing Hamas re-arming in Gaza. 

Britain, France and Germany have also offered to send warships to the region to assist in blocking Hamas smuggling efforts. The Royal Navy may patrol the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as part of this effort.[3] Again, an offer of direct military assistance of this type by European countries is without precedent, and is testimony to the changed nature of the conflict, and to growing awareness of that change. 

The Israeli-US Memorandum of Understanding on preventing smuggling from Iran to Gaza further demonstrated the extent to which the international community is aware that arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip is a problem of concern to all, not just to Israel.  Israel, in the course of its operation, made clear that addressing this issue was of paramount importance. At no time during the operation did Israel declare its goal as the destruction of the Hamas regime. Rather, the intention was to weaken the regime, and prevent Hamas from continuing and completing its project of turning Gaza into a heavily armed Iranian forward base on the Mediterranean. The MOU lays the basis for a determined Israeli and American effort in this regard. 

It is too soon to accurately gauge whether Operation Cast Lead will have serious, negative diplomatic ramifications for Israel in terms of its relations with European countries. On the one hand, there has been real concern about the awakening of rage among local Muslim populations, and the implications this could have for domestic security. On the other hand, the decision of the major European leaders to come to Jerusalem over the weekend and engage in an almost unprecedented display of identification with Israel is very significant. The appearance of European leaders in Jerusalem, and their commitments to tackle smuggling, appear to indicate a strong awareness that the battle between moderates and extremists in the region is not Israel’s alone, and that its outcome will impact directly on European interests.

Strategic implications

Iran and its allies have made implacable opposition to Israel a central element in their regional strategy. A key reason for this focus is that non-Arab, non-Sunni Iran has an obvious ‘legitimacy gap’ in trying to appeal to the Sunni Arabs who form the majority population in the Middle East. Opposing Israel, and building a militant, Islamist alternative to mainstream Palestinian nationalism is a means by which Teheran can build its regional appeal. 

A central element of the Iranian strategy is the notion that organizations engaged in war with Israel which are supported by Iran, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, have devised an effective means of fighting. The doctrine of ‘muqawama’ (resistance) holds that the greater willingness to self-sacrifice of the Islamist fighters will render Israel’s conventional advantages superfluous.[4] The general sense in the last years has been that this doctrine was on the ascendant, delivering victories to its determined adherents. The Second Lebanon War of 2006 was seen as a central achievement for this doctrine.  Hamas’s routing of Fatah in Gaza in July 2007 appeared to offer further proof of its success. 

Israeli planners spoke of restoring Israel’s ‘deterrence’ in the current operation. What Israel intended to do was to deliver a clear setback to the ‘muqawama’ doctrine and its adherents.  Hamas believed that Israel would not dare to conduct a major ground operation in Gaza, because of the inevitable loss of life among IDF troops.  Hamas had constructed its defences among the civilian population, using Palestinian civilians effectively as human shields. 

In the event, Operation Cast Lead showed that Israel did not fear engaging Hamas in ground combat, even in dense urban areas, and demonstrated that Hamas fighters’ declared commitment and willingness to die did not confer an unanswerable strategic advantage on the movement. In many cases that commitment itself was called into question, when many Hamas men preferred to melt away into the civilian population rather than openly engage the IDF. This is a lesson which will now be studied intently by military planners on both sides. 

Tragically, despite Israel’s efforts to minimize civilian casualties, Hamas’s choice to bury itself amidst the dense civilian population of Gaza led to a significant number of Palestinian non-combatants losing their lives in the course of the operation. Hamas chose to take the concept of ‘war among the people’ literally, establishing its military infrastructure, such as rocket launching sites and weapons dumps in mosques and apartment buildings in the midst of densely populated areas. In so doing it exposed the people it claims to represent to enormous danger. But this ruthless tactic did not to bring the movement military success. Rather, Operation Cast Lead is likely to be remembered as constituting a notable setback for the pro-Iranian alliance in the region. Hamas leaders, threatened with the possible collapse of the regime, and hemmed in to the south by Egypt, have been forced to concede to a ceasefire while the crossings between Israel and Gaza remain currently closed.[5] The IDF, meanwhile, has gone some way towards restoring its reputation as well co-ordinated and effective fighting force, which was damaged in Lebanon in 2006.

Conclusion

 

Israel’s military operation has served to highlight the current central dynamic of international relations in the Middle East. The attempt of a bloc led by Iran to build its influence and power is being opposed by an alliance of pro-western states including Israel and Egypt. There is increasing international awareness of the need to prevent Hamas from following the model established by Hezbollah in south Lebanon. The unprecedented willingness of western countries to involve themselves in preventing Hamas from re arming reflects this awareness. The ceasefire is fragile, and unless there is a real increase in efforts to reduce smuggling, Hamas may have its network of tunnels between northern Sinai and Gaza up and running again in a few months. But the model and doctrine of ‘muqawama’ pioneered by Iran and its allies demonstrated its limits in the recent fighting in Gaza. Hamas is the smallest and least powerful of the elements making up the Iran-led alliance. Its misreading of the balance of capabilities between itself and Israel, and of what Israel would be willing to do, have led to the movement – and by association the regional alliance of which it forms a part – suffering a significant setback in Gaza.

 

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[1]  Roee Nahmias, “Nasrallah: Egypt accomplice in ‘Gaza crime'”, Ynetnews, December 28, 2009. http://www.ynet.co.il

[2] Ian Black, “Egypt and Saudi Arabia among Arab countries to boycott emergency meeting”, Guardian, January 15, 2009.  http://www.guardian.co.uk

[3] “Brown in UK naval offer for Gaza”, BBC Online, January 17, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk

[4] For a fuller definition and description of the doctrine see: Ehud Ya’ari, “The Muqawama doctrine” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 13, 2006. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org

[5]  The opening of the crossings was Hamas’s main stated goal in refusing to renew the ceasefire. Israel has made clear that while the supply of food and medicine entering Gaza will be increased if the ceasefire holds, there can be no complete opening of the crossings for as long as Gilad Shalit remains in captivity.