BICOM

Two top Oslo negotiators give a bold and honest assessment of the legacy of the landmark Israel-PLO deal on its 25^th anniversary, in the first of a series of essays in BICOM’s Fathom journal.

In an exclusive interview, Hussein Agha, who has been at the centre of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations for thirty years, says Oslo was an attempt by Israel to resolve its security predicament, not a historical resolution of the conflict. He criticises Oslo for being too focused on 1967 issues and pretending that 1948 never took place. Agha now believes that Israelis and Palestinians have to get to grips with their conflicting narratives and try and reconcile them through some kind of truth and reconciliation commission in ‘a public process that goes beyond elite level negotiations.’

Agha says both sides need to break out of the Oslo straitjacket and look for something new and proposes that refugees and settlers must be involved directly, ‘you have to hear their voices’ as they are the heart of the conflict. Agha believes the current US team are serious in seeking a deal, but they are wrong to focus on economic issues and wrong to avoid a framework agreement.

In an exclusive article for Fathom, Joel Singer, the Israeli legal advisor to the Oslo talks from 1993-1996, says the main mistake by Rabin and Peres was their expectation that Yasser Arafat, would try and stop terrorism and tackle Hamas. ‘Rabin trusted Arafat to fight Hamas better than Israel could, but when Hamas started killing Israelis, Arafat did little to stop it. When he finally gave the green light to the Palestinian Police to fight, their ability proved mediocre at best.’ Singer also believes Rabin and Peres erred by not initiating a settlement freeze. While that made political sense, it was a short-sighted approach. ‘The Jewish population of the West Bank has increased fourfold since 1993 and it is hard to imagine how any Israeli Prime Minister will be able to evacuate all of them now.’

Singer concludes that Oslo’s main success was to create an autonomous Palestinian leadership in the West Bank which handles most of the daily affairs of most Palestinians. It helped Palestinians build their national infrastructure and opened the door for Israel to establish relations with many Arab countries, helping lead to peace with Jordan and strengthen relations with Egypt. Finally Singer says Oslo laid the foundations for future agreements between the sides. ‘Having fought one another for a century, many Palestinians believed that there was no such thing as a Jewish people and refused to accept Israel’s existence. Many Israelis believed that Palestinian peoplehood was invented, and the government ought to negotiate the future status of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan and Egypt, rather than with Palestinian representatives (let alone with the PLO). Oslo’s Mutual Recognition Agreement changed all of that and created the basis for an agreement in the future.’

Secret negotiations between Israel and the PLO concluded in Oslo on 20 August 1993 and Letters of Mutual Recognition were exchanged on 9 September in which the PLO recognised the State of Israel and Israel recognised the PLO as “the representative of the Palestinian people”.

The Oslo Accords, or Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements were signed in Washington DC on 13 September 1993 at a White House ceremony with US President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat.