BICOM

Photo by Avi Ohayon (GPO)

• There are a series of intense four-party diplomatic negotiations ongoing to see if normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia can be reached.
• The US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinians each have a list of demands and priorities, with the challenge being to reconcile them.
• The confluence of interests is such that normalisation has become a key priority for all three major parties to the process: US President Biden, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Saudi Crown Prince bin Salman.
• Unlike their harsh criticism and boycotting of the Abraham Accords process, the Palestinians have engaged with the Saudis to represent their interests.

Israel-US track

• Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu met Wednesday with US President Biden. The two spoke for an hour at a hotel in Manhattan. Despite Netanyahu waiting nine months and meeting in a New York hotel and not the White House, nevertheless Biden’s approach appeared warm, in recognition of their long standing friendship of over four decades.
• Biden immediately eased concerns by suggesting that Netanyahu will be invited to the White House before the end of the year.
• In the context of a deal with Saudi Arabia, Israel’s three key objectives are:
  • Building a united front against Iranian aggression.
  • Bringing an end to the century long Arab-Israeli conflict.
  • Securing enhanced US security support whilst maintaining Israeli freedom of action.
• On preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon, Netanyahu said that “that shared goal of ours can be achieved by a credible military threat, crippling sanctions and supporting the brave men and women of Iran who despise that regime and who are our real partners for a better future.”
• On the significance of Israel-Saudi normalisation, Netanyahu said: “I think such a peace would go a long way… to advance the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, achieve reconciliation between the Islamic world and the Jewish state.”
• With both the Saudis and Americans eager for a deal to include a significant gesture to or progress with the Palestinians, Netanyahu appeared open to the idea, saying that normalisation could “advance a genuine peace between Israel and the Palestinians.” He nonetheless clarified that “Palestinians should be part of the process but shouldn’t have a veto over the process.”
• A senior administration official later suggested that Netanyahu knew he would “have to do some very hard things” including “some component related to the fundamental issue between Israelis and Palestinians.”
• On judicial reform, a White House statement suggested that Biden expressed “concern about any fundamental changes to Israel’s democratic system, absent the broadest possible consensus.” He further championed the “democratic values that lie at the heart of our partnership, including checks and balances in our systems.”

The Saudi position

• In his most extensive English language interview ever, released shortly after the Netanyahu-Biden meeting, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) confirmed that “every day we get closer” to a normalisation deal.
• Saudi priorities include:
  • Security guarantees from the US, in the form of a defence pact and the sale of advance weapons, e.g. F-35 fighter jets.
  • US approval of and assistance with a civilian nuclear programme. Including, most controversially, uranium enrichment on Saudi soil.
  • Israeli concessions towards the Palestinians.
• “For us, the Palestinian issue is very important,” he said. “We need to solve that part… And we have a good negotiations strategy til now. We got to see where we go. We hope that will reach a place that will ease the life of the Palestinians and get Israel as a player in the Middle East.”
• The most striking admission of the interview came when MBS confirmed that an Iranian nuclear weapon would trigger the Saudi pursuit of one, which experts fear would elicit a further nuclear arms race in the region featuring Turkey and Egypt.
• Regarding the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon, MBS warned that “If they get one, we have to get one, for security reasons and the balance of power in the Middle East. But we don’t want to see that.”
• MBS, for his part, sees a deal in the context of his wider ‘2030’ effort to modernise the Saudi kingdom.

Saudi demands on the Palestinians’ behalf

• A senior delegation acting on behalf of Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Mahmoud Abbas recently visited Riyadh to make explicit their demands. Reports have suggested that in a radical departure from the traditional Palestinian position demanding immediate recognition of a Palestinian state, the PA has indicated a willingness to accept an interim agreement were it to include the following components:
  • Transferring more areas of the West Bank to Palestinian autonomy.
  • A commitment that East Jerusalem will be the capital of a future Palestinian state.
  • An Israeli commitment towards an eventual two-state solution.
  • The reopening of the PLO office in Washington DC, previously closed by President Trump.
  • Approving orderly payments for Palestinian prisoners without Israeli reductions.
  • The reopening of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem.
  • The Palestinians gaining full representation at the United Nations.
  • The freezing of Israeli building in new West Bank settlements.
  • The issuing of Palestinian building permits in Area C (currently under full Israeli control).
  • The strengthening of the PA’s security forces.

The US Agenda

• Normalisation is a huge opportunity for the US to redraw the diplomatic map with historic consequences.
• By bringing Israel and Saudi together, the US reinforces its alliances and influence in the Middle East and thwarts growing Chinese-Russian-Iranian confluence of interests.
• All of which would be a major diplomatic dividend for Biden to take into presidential elections in a year’s time.

There remain weighty challenges to reconciling each side’s demands

• The ability to enrich uranium on Saudi soil is of profound importance to MBS.
• The initial posture of both Israel and the US is one of shared concern over the threat of nuclear proliferation. On Saudi nuclear enrichment, it is understood that US and Israeli concerns are identical. A senior Israeli official said of Washington and Jerusalem’s approach to the nuclear question: “we’ve seen completely eye to eye right from the start. On what we cannot do and what it is we might be able to do,” adding that Israel would insist on “a lot” of safeguards.
• Netanyahu has tasked the Ministry of Defence, Mossad, the IDF, and Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission to fully assess the ramifications of a Saudi civilian nuclear project and present a united position.
• Under what is known as the ‘Begin Doctrine’, the consistent Israeli policy is to oppose the spread of nuclear capability in the region. Even if the current Saudi ruling elite is in earnest in its insistence that its ambitions are purely civilian, it cannot be guaranteed that future regimes will not use the technology to embark on a weapons programme, especially in the event of Iran acquiring this capability.
• In an effort to reach a normalisation agreement, creative options are being pursued, including Saudi collaboration with US counterparts on a potential US-run uranium-enrichment operation in Saudi Arabia. US oversight over enrichment would provide some reassurance on the purely civilian character of the programme.
• Safeguards could include the ability to perform a remote shutdown of enrichment facilities, though this technology is not fool-proof.
• The list of Palestinian demands above is being viewed as a “wish-list”, not all of which can be realistically delivered. For example, the US do not accept the idea of full Palestinian representation at the UN at this point. Israel is also highly unlikely to accept a settlement freeze or the transfer of territory.
• Earlier this week, 12 Likud MKs sent a letter to Netanyahu warning that “We will agree to peace only in exchange for peace,” and that there could be “no concessions on the homeland.”
• Netanyahu’s determination to secure normalisation could find him in conflict with his own party’s right flank and coalition partners Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir who will assuredly oppose any concessions to the White House on either the Palestinian or judicial reform fronts.
• The Biden administration could face opposition from the left flank of the Democratic party which is wary of closer ties with the Saudis (a wariness previously shared with Biden himself) and likely to push for Israeli concessions to the Palestinians more substantial than those sought by the Saudis or even the Palestinian Authority.
• Nor are Biden’s hurdles provided only by to those to his left. The defence alliance also demanded by the Saudis, including the sale of advanced US weapons, will require two-thirds of the Senate to ratify. Thus, even if he succeeds in persuading all Democratic senators to vote in favour, a substantial number of rival Republicans will also have to support it. Knowing that they will be affording Biden a major victory in the leadup to a presidential election, this could be a tough sell. Biden’s estimation is that only Netanyahu (and his close advisor Ron Dermer) can convince sufficient Republicans to cross the aisle.
• All parties to the potential deal are aware that its achievement is likelier under a Democratic administration than a Republican, since Democratic lawmakers are unlikely to set their concerns over both the Saudi regime and the Israeli coalition aside in support of a Republican administration. The window of opportunity is thus ever narrowing.

Looking ahead: At 1415 UK time, Netanyahu will address the UN. He will expound the benefits of ‘widening the circle of peace’ and the necessity of the international community addressing Iranian nuclear ambition, regional destabilisation, and international terrorism.

• Netanyahu may also highlight the economic dividends of an Israel-Saudi agreement, building upon Biden’s G20 announcement of a trade corridor from India, through the Middle East, to Europe, and the opportunities for all parties to expand economic and energy cooperation.
• Due to the Palestinian demands and his own domestic issues, observers will be keenly watching the language the prime minister uses on the Palestinian issue.
• The complexities of the situation described above mean that normalisation negotiations are likely to continue over the next few months.
• The White House confirmed that an invitation to Netanyahu for a formal visit would be forthcoming for some time before January 2024.
• Biden and Netanyahu also agreed to work towards holding a third summit between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the US, Egypt and Jordan in the near future, after those at Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh.
• US comments also referenced “the likely convening soon of a ministerial meeting” of the Negev Forum, which will bring together Israel, the US, Egypt, and Abraham Accord countries. Israeli officials suggested it will be held in Morocco next month.
• Were Israel and Saudi Arabia to reach agreement with the US on a defence pact, it is likely that other regional allies (e.g. Jordan, Egypt, the UAE) will look for similar guarantees.
• In the longer term, achieving normalisation with Saudi Arabia would likely open up Israel to normalised relations with the wider Muslim world, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan.