Forty-three years later, the Yom Kippur War is still remembered in the public consciousness mainly for the intelligence failure which preceded it. The Israeli intelligence received sufficient reliable information about Egypt and Syria’s intentions to launch a war, but because of what was called “the conception” its leaders refused to read the writing on the wall. The result was that Israel was surprised and caught unprepared.

The claims against the intelligence are correct. It was a resonating failure, which stemmed both from the devotion to that conception and from too much self-confidence. But it is uncertain that the lesson of what happened in 1973 will prevent similar intelligence mistakes in the future. History, from the days of the story of Troy to the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, provides numerous examples of surprises and deceptions in the battlefield. The failure in identifying the deception is the result of human error, and it is impossible to guarantee that similar mistakes will not happen in the future.

Alongside the intelligence mistake, there was an even greater failure in the Yom Kippur War, which was more significant result-wise, and mainly unforgiveable. I am talking about the ignorance of the IDF’s top echelon. The leaders of the army, including the chief of staff, the command chiefs and others, simply did not know what they had to know by the power of their position: The military doctrine, the abilities of the IDF they commanded and how a command and control system should operate.

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