On August 11, Nadav Pollak and Hanin Ghaddar addressed a Washington Institute Policy Forum marking the publication of the new study “The Transformation of Hezbollah by Its Involvement in Syria.” Pollak, the paper’s author and a former Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Fellow at the Institute, currently works as a counterterrorism analyst at the Anti-Defamation League. Ghaddar is the Institute’s inaugural Friedmann Visiting Fellow and former managing editor of Lebanon’s NOW news website. The following is a rapporteur’s summary of their remarks.

NADAV POLLAK

Despite extensive reporting on Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, little attention has been paid to the experience the militia has gained there or the consequences it faces back home in Lebanon. The Hezbollah contingent in Syria (often referred to as “Hezbollah’s Eastern Command” by Israeli analysts) deploys between 5,000 and 8,000 fighters at any given time, including Special Forces (Katibat Radwan), standing forces from all units, part-time fighters (taabia), and new recruits who have undergone a fast-tracked combat training period of 60-90 days — an unprecedented development. Still, Hezbollah fighters are not cannon fodder; they often lead battles and command Syrian and Iranian militias in combat.

This heavy involvement in Syria seems to be influencing the group’s overall approach to military planning and execution. According to a study written by an Israel Defense Forces officer in 2014, Hezbollah would likely employ a more offensive fighting strategy in any future war against Israel, with the objective of shortening the conflict’s length. And regardless of whether the group actually implements such a strategy, there is no doubt that some of its military capabilities have improved significantly. It has learned how to use its drones more effectively, take better advantage of its short-range rockets, and execute complex offensive operations.

Read the full article at the Washington Insitute.