The weaknesses and failings of the JCPOA are easily identifiable – while some issues are more significant than others, taken together the problems underscore that keeping Iran from nuclear weapons, especially after a decade, is anything but ensured. The most problematic issues are the expiration date of the deal in 10-15 years, without this being linked to any change in Iran’s aggressive behavior and its nuclear-related ambitions; and the fact that Iran’s uranium enrichment program has been legitimized by the deal despite the fact that Iran worked for decades on a military nuclear program in violation of the NPT. Indeed, from year 11 Iran will begin a vastly stepped-up enrichment program based on the installation and operation of thousands of advanced models of centrifuges that will spin many times faster than those currently in use – advanced models that the deal has allowed Iran to work on from day one.

Other prominent issues include the fact that Iran’s nuclear capable ballistic missiles were left outside the purview of the negotiations even though they constitute a central component of a nuclear weapons capability; that the PMD (possible military dimensions) file was closed despite both lack of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA in its investigation last summer, and the nevertheless damning IAEA report on Iran’s weapons-related activities that was released in December 2015; and that the ability to inspect suspicious military facilities in Iran down the road will at the very least be an ongoing issue of dispute between Iran and the P5+1 because the provisions of the JCPOA are open to polar interpretations over whether, how, and when inspectors might be able to gain access.

In the face of these glaring deficiencies, how is the case nevertheless made in support of the deal? First, the thrust of JCPOA supporters’ assessments of the deal one year on is on the three main concessions that Iran did agree to in order to get badly needed sanctions relief: significantly reduced stockpile of low-enriched uranium, removal of two-thirds of centrifuges from the enrichment facilities, and cement poured into the heart of the Arak reactor. Moreover, supporters tend to focus on the short-term benefits of the deal, normally glossing over the more serious implications for the longer term. They do so even though the long-term is not that far away: only 10-15 years. Oddly enough, Obama administration officials have actually focused on the long term, to the point of claiming that Iran has been stopped from ever achieving a nuclear weapons capability. But this claim is obviously not guaranteed by this deal.

Read the full article at Times of Israel