For successive Israeli governments and the defense establishment, the Syrian arena has traditionally been considered Israel’s “front yard” in terms of threat analysis, early warning and force readiness. The defense budget, comprising  7.7per cent of Israel’s G.N.P. in 2011 (latest available data), included considerable allocations designed to meet the Syrian army’s threat. In the series of Arab-Israeli wars, it was the Syrian army that received the highest marks by military analysts and Israeli generals. Its soldiers generally fought bravely, its command and control was robust and effective, and on balance it proved to be the most stubborn enemy of the I.D.F. In addition to its formidable conventional force, Syria built the largest and deadliest stockpile of chemical weapons of various kinds. All told, on Israel’s list of prominent threats over the last three decades, Syria featured very high, second only to Iran with its nuclear program.

Largely because of its threat potential, Israeli prime ministers, including Benjamin Netanyahu in his early years, showed interest in neutralizing it through diplomatic and political means. Israeli-Syrian negotiations on the basis of ‘land for peace’ took place in several intervals, usually through U.S. mediation, and centered on detailed security arrangements that were supposed to ensure long-term stability. The talks never bore fruit, but a certain degree of respect was created between the leaders—despite neither the late Hafez nor Bashar al-Assad ever meeting their Israeli counterparts—and the small negotiating teams of both countries. The 1974 Disengagement Agreement created a de-jure and de-facto long-term cease-fire, which was carefully maintained by both sides. The only caveat to this almost-idyllic status-quo was in the shape of Hezbollah and its Iranian patron, using Syria as a transit route for sophisticated weapons shipments, mainly missiles of various kinds. Israel adopted a policy of active prevention of these shipments, which had the potential of creating friction with the Syrian regime. However, in yet another demonstration of good judgment, the reactions were always restrained and clearly calculated to restore the status quo ante. Israel’s prevention was operationally effective, but strategically futile. Hezbollah was able to amass missiles and rockets, build a formidable military force, then rebuild and multiply it after the 2006 Lebanon war, following an Iranian game plan and with active Syrian assistance.

And then came the ‘Arab Spring’ with all its might and mayhem, turning Syria into a geostrategic and humanitarian disaster zone, right there in Israel’s front yard, undoing decades of carefully kept ‘rules of engagement’ and unraveling piles of strategic assessments and military doctrines. Israel—like all other regional state actors—was caught by total surprise. The then defense minister Ehud Barak—and former head of the I.D.F.’s joint chiefs and former prime minister who negotiated with Syria—was quick to predict Assad’s fall ‘within weeks or months,’ echoing a consensus view within the defense and policy establishment, building on decades of meticulous intelligence work and supposedly ‘intimate knowledge’ of the Syrian mafia state’s innermost dynamics.

Read the full article at Middle East Institute.