The agreement reached last week in Vienna between the world powers and Iran on Iran’s nuclear program, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a highly problematic agreement that entails risks to Israel’s national security. It is very likely that the agreement will be implemented and its practical measures put into effect, and it appears that Israel has little ability to influence the process at this point. Still, a comparison between the Vienna Agreement and the Munich Agreement signed with Nazi Germany in 1938 is far-fetched and removed from Israel’s current strategic situation, as Israel is a strong country that, with the adoption of appropriate policy, is capable of contending successfully with the ramifications of this problematic agreement.

The US administration’s position that this is the best possible agreement reflects two assumptions embraced by all six powers negotiating with Iran. The P5+1 believed that the sanctions regime against Iran would crumble if an agreement were not achieved, and the negotiating powers would be left without any significant leverage that could be wielded against Tehran. Furthermore, in the course of the negotiations, the military option was effectively removed by the United States – which undermined the main point of leverage over the Iranian regime. Throughout the negotiations, the Obama administration insisted that the only alternative to an agreement was war, and that the American people would not stomach another war in the Middle East. This statement is highly problematic, from both operational and historical perspectives. There are a variety of ways to neutralize a country’s nuclear capability in a surgical, pinpoint manner, and without escalation. Given that already at an early stage of the talks the United States essentially eliminated the possibility of a military strike and made it clear to the Iranians that it was interested in reaching a “legacy” agreement, its position in the negotiations was weak. Consequently, it was specifically Iran, which needed the agreement far more than the administration, that secured achievements regarding issues debated since the Lausanne understandings of April 2015 (R&D of advanced centrifuges; the possible military dimensions of the program – PMD; and particularly the issue of supervision, “anywhere, anytime,” as originally demanded by the P5+1). Ultimately, the negotiations concluded with an agreement much closer to the Iranian position. This dynamic, as it unfolded during the negotiations, does not bode well for how future Iranian violations of the agreement will be handled.

The agreement, and specifically its problematic aspects, should be assessed on three levels: the short term nuclear aspect, the long term nuclear aspect, and Iran’s negative conventional activity in the Middle East.

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