Over two decades of negotiations with Israel, the Palestinian leadership was careful to present demands and conditions but avoided coming up with its own initiative to resolve the conflict. In contrast, at the September 7, 2014 conference of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is expected to spell out his initiative for establishing an independent Palestinian state. Abbas first presented the plan to Khaled Mashal in Doha toward the end of Operation Protective Edge. According to Palestinian sources, Mashal approved it. It was also reported that a Palestinian delegation headed by Saeb Erekat will travel to Washington to discuss the plan with Secretary of State John Kerry.

The Abbas plan does not relate to the Arab Peace Initiative or any existing regional framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The plan consists of three graduated alternatives. The first involves US-led negotiations between Israel and the PA for a limited time period, which would begin with Israel’s presentation of its idea of permanent borders. The goal is to determine the borders of the Palestinian state and achieve Israeli recognition of the state, all within four months. Little is new in this idea. In case this alternative fails or is not tried at all due to Israeli and US rejections, the second alternative would be activated, whereby the PA, through the Arab League, would demand that the UN Security Council instruct Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territory within three to five years. Should both the first and second alternatives fail, the PA would join all international institutions and organizations, sign the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, and subsequently file a suit against Israel and its leaders.

Abbas’ new-old initiative emerges against a fairly complex background. The PA is ostensibly one of the winners in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire recently sewn by Egypt. According to the 11-point Egyptian document of August 15, 2014, the transfer of goods to the Gaza Strip will be coordinated with the PA; the PA will participate in the reconstruction of Gaza’s infrastructures and will, together with Israel and international aid organizations, coordinate the supply of resources intended for reconstruction; and starting January 2015, the PA’s security services are to redeploy to the north and east of the Gaza Strip. Finally, according to the Egyptian document, the possibility of building an airport and seaport will be discussed in the context of the Oslo Accords and earlier agreements, all of which were signed between Israel and the PLO.

In fact, the word “Hamas” is not mentioned at all in the ceasefire agreement, meaning that Egypt and Israel acknowledge the PA as the entity responsible for what happens in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, however, this says nothing about the situation on the ground where Hamas currently is in practice in control and enjoys rising popularity. It is doubtful that the PA will succeed in handling the security challenges of the ceasefire agreement and impose its rule on the Gaza Strip. Still, the agreement formally cements a situation in which Hamas is weakened and contained, and Mashal recognizes – if only implicitly – negotiations with Israel as a means to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Read the article in full at INSS.