The reconciliation agreement reached recently by Fatah and Hamas is, in essence, similar to previous agreements between the two organizations (Mecca in 2007, Cairo in 2011, and the 2012 Doha declaration) and includes an agreement to establish a joint national government of technocrats, headed by President Abbas, and hold parliamentary and presidential elections in the Palestinian Authority. The understandings that were formulated postponed the discussion of security, especially the future of the military wing of Hamas and its capabilities. This issue will be handled by a security committee to be convened only after the establishment of a unity government, which means a continuation of the status quo, i.e., separate management of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The agreement neither mentions any binding dates for completing the discussions on the unity government nor stipulates a date for elections once the government is formed.

An analysis of the Palestinian reconciliation agreement must consider both what is not included and what is covered. Yet despite its brevity – the agreement refers to two issues only – and despite the importance of what is not included, which may prove to be the stumbling blocks when it comes to implementation of the agreement, it is important to assess the significance of the agreement’s validity specifically at this point in time.

The agreement is a result of the internal weakness of both organizations, with each suffering a steady erosion of legitimacy and public support. In this sense, the domestic policy of both Palestinian groups is what dictated the move. Hamas finds itself is at an all-time low because of its conflict with the current Egyptian regime after the downfall of its patron, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The ongoing economic crisis in the Gaza Strip due to the closure of the tunnels and the tight Egyptian blockade has aggravated Hamas’s loss of public support. Abbas too has lost the support of the Palestinian public given the lack of faith in his political direction. His legitimacy is lowest among his constituency, especially the younger generation of Fatah, which has tired of him and the leadership in general. At the same time, Abbas is driven by the sense that he might be defamed as having split the Palestinian camp.

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