Israel has been preparing for escalation in the northern theater for a long time. In particular, it fears that the events in Syria will spill over into Israel, creating an area along the Golan Heights border that is not controlled by a central government and that will be used by rogue terrorist and jihadi elements against Israel. Indeed, the three violent incidents on Israel’s border with Syria and Lebanon since early March 2014 may signal that the long standing situation is changing: as these events harbored greater potential for escalation, perhaps a lengthy period of relative quiet in Israel’s northern theater (Syria and Lebanon) may be ending, with the area in question becoming a site of increasing activity. The challenge that can be expected in the northern theater is complex, given the various actors with conflicting interests and objectives. This could drag Israel, willingly or unwillingly, into a series of border incidents, a prolonged conflict, or even rocket fire or gunfire deep into Israeli territory and widespread escalation.

However, the incident of March 18, in which an IDF patrol on the Golan Heights was struck by a roadside bomb, is not at the heart of these scenarios, because all signs point to the bomb’s having been placed by Hizbollah-backed forces, apparently with the knowledge and aid of Assad’s forces. Indeed, it is likely that all three incidents in March – two on the Syrian border, in territories controlled by the Assad regime and Assad loyalists, and the third in the area of Mount Dov, a Hizbollah stronghold – were Hizbollah attacks against Israel.

The apparent catalyst for the recent wave of incidents is the February 24, 2014 attack on a weapons convoy from Syria to Lebanon, attributed to the IAF. Unlike previous attacks attributed to the IDF, this strike took place in Lebanese territory and apparently resulted in more extensive damage than the destruction of weapons. In turn, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah promised to respond at the appropriate time and place. Nasrallah and his forces may believe that the aerial attack in Lebanon indicates a change in the rules of the game that were ostensibly in place until now, and that therefore Hizbollah must signal that it will not accept continued air strikes in Lebanon. More generally, it is obligated to respond, inter alia, in order to maintain its image as Lebanon’s protector against Israel.

If the assessment is correct that Assad (or his forces) were a party to the bombs in the Golan Heights, at least in terms of knowledge thereof, the question is, what led to this change in the previous policy, namely, not to respond to air strikes attributed to Israel? There are a number of developments that may affect Assad and Hizbollah’s cost-benefit assessment of the situation and the expected harm they will suffer from testing the boundaries of the rules of the game with Israel and risking escalation.

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