The only way Iran will ultimately accept a deal that genuinely sets back its nuclear program in the long-run is if it believes that the alternative is the further ratcheting up of sanctions to a degree that threatens the survival of the regime, combined with the credible threat of military force.

This does not require the invasion of Iran. The United States almost certainly has the means to conduct air-strikes that can significantly set back the Iranian program. Even more importantly, it has the capability to repeat these strikes if and when required, thereby sending the message to the Iranians that if they attempt to reconstitute the program – a very expensive proposition – the U.S. will strike again.

So why then has the threat of credible force by the U.S. been so sorely lacking? The usual answer is to blame Obama. But the problem is much deeper, going back to the Iraq War. Immediately following 9/11, there was extraordinary public support in the West for the extensive use of force against terrorist threats. But when no WMD were found in Iraq and when the cost of the war in terms of blood and treasure spiraled without any sign of democratization, support for the extensive use of force plummeted.

Read the article in full at Haaretz