The shortening breakout times have implications for any negotiation with Iran. An essential finding is that they are currently too short and shortening further, based on the current trend of centrifuge deployments. As a result, the current negotiations should result in: lengthening the breakout times, shortening the time to detect breakout, and gaining assurance that a secret centrifuge plant is unlikely to be built or finished.

Increased transparency.

There are several additional transparency measures that are important, although a discussion of these measures is outside the scope of this report. But two points are worth mentioning. The first is that transparency measures by themselves have inherent limits and cannot address fully the risk posed by short breakout times. Nonetheless, Iran should be pressed to increase the frequency of inspections at enrichment plants, install remote camera monitoring at enrichment plants, implement early notification of the construction of nuclear plants, ratify the Additional Protocol, and establish full inspections of its centrifuge research, development, and manufacturing complex.

Lengthening breakout.

A negotiation should be guided by the need to lengthen breakout times significantly from their current values. A reasonable minimum breakout time should be six months or preferably longer. If breakout took greater than or equal to six months, the IAEA could clearly detect it long before one SQ is produced, and the international community would have time to marshal a response to stop Iran producing enough WGU for a nuclear weapon.

The process of lengthening breakout times involves several variables. The key ones are the number of centrifuges, the stocks of LEU, the enrichment level of the LEU, and the type of centrifuges installed. In practical terms, a six month breakout at declared sites could be achieved several ways. Based on the estimates in this report, four cases are evaluated that result in a breakout time of at least six months.

Read the full report at ISIS online.