BICOM

Key points

• Thirty years after it was signed, the Israel-Egypt peace agreement remains an important and successful peace treaty, and has significant ramifications for contemporary regional diplomacy.
• The treaty illustrated how strong leadership in Israel was able to break existing paradigms, reach reconciliation with the largest and most powerful Arab nation and shift public opinion in support of the agreement.
• Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem expressed his acceptance of Israel as a legitimate sovereign state in the region and was successful in breaking decades of animosity between the countries.
• The involvement and support of US President Jimmy Carter, at great political risk, and his administration was crucial in facilitating the agreement, bridging the differences between the sides and providing the needed assurances for successful implementation.  

Introduction

The Israel-Egypt peace treaty, signed in Washington on 26 March 1979, was the first peace agreement between Israel and an Arab country and continues to serve as a model for regional diplomacy and peaceful conflict resolution. Among other aspects, the peace accords between Israel and Egypt established the formula of land-for-peace as the diplomatic blueprint for negotiations, highlighted the importance of determined leadership in swaying hesitant public opinion to support the heavy price of territorial concessions, and understood the need for Israel to be accepted as a rightful and legitimate partner in the region.

Thirty years on, the Israel-Egypt peace agreement presents relevant historical lessons for the ongoing negotiations between Israel and its neighbours and the prospect of peace in the coming years. The following analysis looks back at the political and diplomatic events that led to the treaty, analyses its components and outlines some of the insights the agreement may provide for present-day diplomacy in the Middle East.

Diplomatic and political background

The Israel-Egypt peace accords were reached at a time of political change both in Israel and the US. In Washington, President Carter took office in January 1977 and vowed to rejuvenate the Middle East peace process through multilateral negotiations between Israel, Egypt, Syria and a Palestinian delegation. In May 1977, the Israeli centre-right Likud party headed by Menachem Begin achieved a dramatic election victory that ended the three decades of sole centre-left Labour rule since Israel’s founding in 1948. Despite his conservative political positions, Begin was supportive of the American initiatives and did not object to the inclusion of the Palestinian delegation, this at a time when recognition of Palestinian demands was still considered a marginal stance in Israeli politics. In Egypt, president Anwar Sadat was still regarded as a popular hero following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which was perceived in Egypt as a victory over Israel and a renewal of Egypt’s political significance in the region.

Following the war, initial diplomatic efforts were made by Henry Kissinger, then secretary of state in the Nixon administration. Through ‘shuttle diplomacy’ between Cairo and Jerusalem, Kissinger was able to reach a series of disengagement treaties that stabilised the area after the war. On 18 January 1974, Egypt and Israel signed their first disengagement agreement, separating their military forces along a 20-mile north-south line on the east side of the Suez Canal. Israeli forces withdrew a few miles to the east, while Egyptian forces thinned out to the west. A United Nations peacekeeping force filled in the vacated land. It was, in effect, the first land-for-peace agreement between Israel and an Arab neighbour.

The Carter administration was also looking for a broader Middle East agreement through the multilateral, regional track. However, Egyptian and Israeli officials simultaneously began secret talks, which prepared the ground for Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem on 19 November 1977. In this groundbreaking visit, Sadat met with prime minister Begin and became the first Arab leader to address the Knesset, outlining his vision of comprehensive peace in the region. For many Israelis, the visit was a long-awaited sign that peace between Israel and its neighbours may be in reach, and Sadat was received with great public anticipation. The Israeli public saw Sadat’s visit as an acceptance of Israel’s legitimate place in the region, and the breaking of the ring of animosity that surrounded it since its establishment. At the conclusion of the visit, Begin coined the phrase that became one of the hallmarks of the accords between the two countries: ‘No more war, no more bloodshed.’

Both the Israeli and Egyptian leaders faced growing opposition when announcing their intention to open direct negotiations towards peace. Begin was accused by left-wing groups of stalling progress on the talks, while Israeli settlers in the Sinai Peninsula opposed any negotiations based on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. Begin also encountered opposition from members of his Likud party, among them Ehud Olmert, who would later admit to Begin’s courage and vision. Sadat, on the other hand, faced fierce international pressure by members of the Soviet bloc who feared the demise of their regional influence. Sadat was also accused of breaking away from the united Arab alliance that was formed to conduct talks on the multilateral track, consequently leading to Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League. Sadat’s determination to reach peace with Israel meant that the notion of pan-Arabism, a unified political front of Arab countries strongly advocated by Sadat’s predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser, was substantially weakened.

Despite these pressures, and with strong American support, both leaders proceeded to prepare the ground for the negotiations at the Camp David Summit which began on 5 September 1978. The summit lasted for 13 days, and had to overcome noteworthy differences between the sides, most notably Egypt’s demand that Israel cede its control of the West Bank to Jordan and the Israeli reluctance to remove settlements from the Sinai. A compromise was reached when President Carter, who hosted the talks and was personally involved in their handling, agreed to Begin’s demands regarding the West Bank while supporting Sadat’s demands for the Sinai.

The understandings reached at Camp David paved the way for the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, which was signed at the White House on 26 March 1979, as well as for a document outlining a framework for regional peace agreed on by both parties. In the treaty, Israel agreed to withdraw its armed forces from the Sinai, evacuate its 4,500 civilian inhabitants, and restore it to Egypt in return for normal diplomatic relations, guarantees of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and other nearby waterways such as the Strait of Tiran, and a restriction on the forces Egypt could place on the Sinai Peninsula, especially within 20-40 km from Israel. Israel also agreed to limit its forces a smaller distance (3 km) from the Egyptian border, and to guarantee free passage between Egypt and Jordan. With the withdrawal, Israel also lost the Abu-Rudeis oil fields in the western Sinai, which contained Israel’s only long-term commercially productive wells to date.

The normalisation of relations went into effect in January 1980. Ambassadors were exchanged in February. The boycott laws were repealed by Egypt’s National Assembly the same month, and some trade began to develop, albeit less than Israel had hoped for. In March 1980, regular airline flights were inaugurated. Egypt also began supplying Israel with crude oil. On 19 April, Israel began evacuating Yamit, the largest Israeli settlement in the Sinai, and despite strong resistance from settlers, completed the full withdrawal within a week. Overall redeployment was concluded in 1982.

Thirty years on: the treaty’s implications and significance

The time that has elapsed since the Camp David Accords has left no doubt as to their enormous ramifications on Middle Eastern politics. In general, it is possible to note a number of aspects that remain significant to this day, most significantly that Sadat’s visit and the following peace treaty were signs of acceptance of Israel’s legitimacy in the region; Israel’s willingness to adopt the land-for-peace formula as the basis for peace with its Arab neighbours; and the recognition that Israel’s security needs are a central pillar in any such agreement.

Israel’s willingness to cede its control of the entire Sinai Peninsula and fully withdraw all its military and civilian presence should not be taken for granted. The talks with Egypt began only four years after Israel faced one of the most threatening moments in its history. The coordinated surprise attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces in October 1973 was seen as a significant blow to Israeli confidence in its military power, despite the eventual success of Israeli forces in pushing back the invasion. The willingness of the majority of the Israeli public to overcome the suspicion and resentment towards Sadat, who led the 1973 assault, and give up the Sinai despite its strategic significance proved that peace is attainable even under unpromising conditions. Furthermore, the agreement continues to serve as a precedent, according to which Israel endorses the land-for-peace model in its negotiations with the Palestinians and the Syrians. To this day, the Israel-Egypt peace agreement enjoys ongoing support in Israel and a vast majority of the Israeli public believes that the territorial concessions made by Israeli are justifiable.

The peace accords between Israel and Egypt are rightly identified with the leaders that forged it: Menachem Begin in Israel and Anwar Sadat in Egypt. It would be impossible to imagine the realisation of the agreement without the determination of both leaders to bring an end to the conflict between their countries and the ability to do so despite mutual suspicion and past grievances. During three decades of Israeli Labour rule in Israel, Begin remained in opposition because of his affiliation with the national-conservative politics of the centre-right Revisionist movement. Once elected, Begin defied initial internal and international scepticism and reached an unprecedented agreement with Egypt. Begin proved that strong leadership can overcome traditional ideological paradigms, alleviate domestic fears and secure a peace deal even at the price of territorial concessions. Following Begin’s achievement, it has become a common view that only the political capital of centre-right governments in Israel allows for substantial territorial concessions.

Similarly, Sadat’s leadership was one of the most substantial factors that facilitated the successful implementation of the agreement. The Egyptian president’s visit to Jerusalem, despite vocal objections from his Arab and international allies, convinced many Israelis of his sincerity in reaching out and peacefully resolving the conflict. Sadat set an example, later followed by other Arab leaders, according to which a just and comprehensive peace with Israel is achievable and that progress results only from sustained efforts at communication and cooperation. Although Sadat enjoyed notable public support in Egypt when entering negotiations with Israel in 1977, he consequently faced a growing wave of extreme Islamist opposition, particularly from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Despite an attempt in February 1981 to clamp down on subversive Islamist groups, Sadat was assassinated in October 1981 during a military parade in Cairo by a Palestinian-Egyptian officer.

President Carter and key figures in his administration, such as national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and secretary of state Cyrus Vance, also played a pivotal role in facilitating and mediating between Israel and Egypt. The US began its active participation in the negotiation process only after the sides had made the first steps, and did not seek to impose a predetermined solution. For his part, the American president understood that progress on the Israeli-Egyptian track would be able to counterbalance, to some degree, the deterioration of US standing in the region after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Despite the high political risk it carried, the personal involvement of President Carter helped bridge the gaps between the sides and secure the agreement in the last days of negotiations.

The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was reached partly due to the recognition that any agreement must acknowledge and respect Israel’s security concerns. By ceding control of the Sinai Peninsula, Israel relinquished one of its most important strategic assets. Important military infrastructure had to be relocated and the main buffer zone between Israel and Egypt was handed over. Nonetheless, the agreement secured the demilitarisation of certain regions in the Sinai and the positioning of a multinational peacekeeping force. Egypt’s agreement to these terms proved its intentions to reach long-lasting peace with Israel and enabled Begin to overcome internal opposition. Egypt also greatly benefited from the peace agreement, breaking with the Soviet bloc and realigning itself with the west. Cairo receives large financial and military assistance from the US, which has helped it maintain its position as one of the leading political forces in the Arab world.

Conclusion

At this time of international uncertainty regarding peace in the Middle East, it is important to highlight the lessons of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty and its role in stabilising the region. The past three decades have known periods of improved economic and diplomatic contacts between Jerusalem and Cairo, and other times of uncertainty and instability. Nonetheless, these relations have been able to sustain even difficult moments like terror attacks against Israeli tourists in the Sinai or the mutual accusations surrounding the ongoing smuggling of arms from the Sinai into the Gaza Strip. Common criticism is often directed at the ‘cold peace’ between the countries, which failed to bring about a full normalisation in relations. However, while these claims may be partly true, it is important to note that Egypt and Israel maintain relatively steady diplomatic relations and that no incident of hostility has been perpetuated by either side. The Egyptian regime has time and again rejected popular calls to act militarily against Israel; during the 2006 conflict in Lebanon, for instance, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said, ‘Those who urge Egypt to go to war to defend Lebanon or Hezbollah are not aware that the time of foreign adventures is over.’

Peace between Israel and Egypt has proven that sincere Arab acceptance will find a willing Israeli counterpart in advancing the resolution of the conflict. Sadat’s visit remains a hugely significant moment for a generation of Israelis who see it as the first attempt by the Arab world to reach out and move towards such resolution. The formula of land-for-peace that was established in the 1979 treaty is now broadly accepted across the political spectrum in Israel, shared by left and right-leaning parties. Additionally, Begin proved that not only are right-wing Israeli governments not an obstacle for peace, but also that strong leadership is key in garnering broad support from both sides of the political map and bringing public opinion on board. Furthermore, the accomplishment of reaching peace showed that direct bilateral negotiations, accompanied by strong international involvement, are key. Thirty years on, the Israel-Egypt peace treaty still provides strong reasons for optimism regarding peaceful conflict resolution between Israel and its neighbours.