BICOM

• President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Lebanon comes at a moment of high internal political tension in the country, ahead of possible indictments by the Special Tribunal established to investigate the murder of former Lebanese PM Rafik al-Hariri in 2005.
• Hezbollah already rejected any indictment of its members and portrayed the Tribunal as an ‘Israeli project’. Ahmadinejad is expected to offer strong support for Hezbollah during his visit, helping to further strain the situation.
•  Hezbollah is currently the most powerful single political force in Lebanon and owes much of its strength to Iranian support. The Iranians, meanwhile, are using Hezbollah to establish their regional power.
• President Ahmadinejad is looking to gain support in the Arab world after the controversial Iranian elections and the growing Arab opposition to the Iranian nuclear programme.
• The visit will showcase Iran’s role in Lebanon and across the region as a factor opposing the peaceful solution of disputes, and supporting militancy, polarization and ongoing conflict.

 

This Wednesday (13 October), Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is scheduled to make a two-day visit to Lebanon. Ahamdinejad’s visit comes at a moment of high internal political tension in Lebanon. The country’s highly conflicted factions are nervously awaiting possible indictments by the Special Tribunal established by the UN to investigate the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in 2005. The current indications are that the Tribunal will indict Hezbollah members for involvement in the murder. However, the movement has made clear that it has no intention of handing its members over for trial and has sought to portray the Tribunal as an ‘Israeli project‘. Ahmadinejad is expected to offer strong support for Hezbollah during his visit, helping to further polarise the situation.

The Iranian president is expected to tour southern Lebanon and reportedly visit the Israel-Lebanon border. Beyond the images that will likely emerge out of Ahmadinejad’s high profile trip, the visit provides an insight into the constant involvement of external forces in further straining Lebanon’s fragile political situation and the regional situation in general.

What is the purpose of Ahmadinejad’s visit to Lebanon?

The Iranian regime has invested heavily in Hezbollah since the organisation was founded under the auspices of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in 1982. For President Ahmadinejad in particular, the promotion of the idea of regional Islamic ‘resistance’ to Israel is a key policy. Hezbollah, which today maintains one of the two remaining active fronts in the conflict between Israel and the Arabs, is the jewel in the crown of this policy.

Hezbollah is currently the most powerful single political force in Lebanon. This status is made possible largely by Iranian military support and financial backing for extensive social, educational and political infrastructure maintained by Hezbollah.

Particular attention is given to Ahmadinejad’s planned visit to southern Lebanon. It is Iranian money, channelled through Hezbollah’s ‘jihad al-bina’a’ (Jihad through construction) organisation, which has made possible the rebuilding and renovation of areas damaged during the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. To some extent the Iranian president will be visiting south Lebanon to inspect the results of a major financial investment undertaken by his regime.

Iran’s renovation work is part of a larger strategy. According to reports, in Bint Jbeil, a large replica of the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem has been constructed, with an Iranian flag atop it. The Iranian president will be seeking to promote the status of Iran as the main backer for a policy of war against Israel. As Fares Souaid of the Lebanese pro-Western March 14 alliance put it, “The message is that Iran is at the border with Israel…Ahmadinejad, through this visit, is saying that Beirut is under Iranian influence and that Lebanon is an Iranian base on the Mediterranean…The Iranian president is here to say that Lebanon is a land of resistance and to reaffirm his project of a continuous war with Israel.”

Souaid’s description is apt, but also raises a broader question: Why does the Iranian regime, and in particular those in it associated with President Ahmadinejad, stress Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians, and Iran’s aggressive policy against Israel?

On one level, Ahmadinejad and those around him are radical Shia Islamists, who are incensed at the notion that land formerly ruled by Muslims is now ruled by non-Muslims, and hence support the re-conquest of the area for Islam, as they see it. Opposition to Israel also plays an instrumental role for establishing Iran as the key, dominant power in the region.

The Palestinian cause remains the flagship political issue for millions of Arabs, and the Iranian attempt to take ‘ownership’ of it is part of Iran’s effort to present itself as the ‘authentic’ defender of the Palestinian cause, supporting a model of ‘resistance’ which allegedly delivers results in a way which the methods of negotiation and compromise do not.

The Iranian ‘hostile takeover’ bid is of course not welcomed by all or even most Palestinians. Certainly, the PA leadership are acutely aware of Iranian intentions in this regard, and repeatedly seek to distance itself from it.

Ahmadinejad’s visit in the context of the present political situation in Lebanon

Ahmadinejad’s visit comes at a time of particular tension in Lebanon. The UN-backed Special Tribunal investigating the murder of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri is rumoured to be preparing indictments against Hezbollah members for involvement in the killing. The Hariri murder in 2005 precipitated the political movement that brought about Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.

The prospect of movement members being tried for the Hariri murder represents a profound challenge to Hezbollah’s status in Lebanon, exposing its unrestrained violence and its willingness to direct it against political rivals. As such, there are fears that indictments could lead to another violent reaction from Hezbollah, similar to the one staged in 2008 during clashes between the group and government forces. Some Lebanese commentators are interpreting the Ahmadinejad visit as a show of support for Hezbollah from its Iranian patron, in the build up to possible renewed internal strife.

Compared with Iran’s blunt involvement, Syria is playing a slightly ambiguous role in current events in Lebanon. While opposed to the Tribunal, the growing power of Hezbollah in Lebanon is also not to Damascus’s liking. Hezbollah is ultimately an Iranian proxy, not a Syrian one and may seek to block Syria’s efforts to rebuild its own power in Lebanon. There is a possibility that Syria would try to present itself as an arbitrator in the event of renewed violence in Lebanon, which could pave the way for their return to dominance in Lebanon.

Ahmadinejad’s visit at a time of such tensions will only exacerbate fears of renewed violence in Lebanon. The charged atmosphere around his visit will focus international and regional media attention and will enable Ahamdinejad to engage in his trademark grandstanding.

Ahmadinejad’s visit and Israel: implications of the visit

While Ahmadinejad will undoubtedly attempt to focus attention on Israel during his visit, the practical implications are negligible. The Israeli-Lebanese border is in a permanent state of tension. The recent killing of an Israeli lieutenant-colonel by a Lebanese army sniper has added to this. Ahmadinejad’s trip to the south is unlikely to significantly affect the already strained situation.

Israeli analysts note that Hezbollah has massively increased its strength in the period since the 2006 war. The movement has received sophisticated weaponry, including the M-600 missile system, from Iran via Syria. The Iranian president’s visit may serve to highlight and focus international attention for a moment on this worrying state of affairs, but no immediate practical in this regard steps are expected.

In his visit to Lebanon the Iranian president will find a country in a state of high political tension, fearing the imminent renewal of political violence. Regrettably, his contribution will be in line with the more general role played by Iran in the region, namely, to lobby, advise and organise against the peaceful and negotiated settlement of disputes.