BICOM

Key Points

• The upcoming Lebanese elections hold broader regional significance. The recent clash between Hezbollah and Egypt has brought into focus the extent to which the Middle East is currently divided between states and movements aligned with an Iran-led alliance, and those broadly aligned with the US and the West. 
• This regional division finds perhaps its purest form in Lebanon, where the upcoming election is defined by a clash between the ‘March 14’ bloc of pro-Western parties and a rival ‘March 8’ movement of pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian parties.
• A victory for Hezbollah and its allies would boost the attempt to build Iranian power on the eastern Mediterranean. Hezbollah is a radical Islamist client of Iran. It is an integral part of a long-term strategy of Iran to gain regional hegemony through the promotion of radical ideology and the application of political violence.

Introduction 

On June 7, Lebanese voters will go to the polls in one of the most significant general elections to take place in the country since the end of the civil war in 1990, with parties fighting for 128 seats in the country’s parliament. The elections hold significance beyond the Lebanese context. In the past days the public clash between Egypt on the one hand, and Hezbollah and their Iranian backers on the other, over alleged Hezbollah plots to carry out attacks in Egypt, has brought into focus the extent to which the Middle East is currently divided. The split is between states and movements aligned with an Iran-led alliance – including Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and increasingly Qatar – and states and movement broadly aligned with the US and the West – including Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. The clash between Egypt and Hezbollah is of deep significance. It lays bare the extent to which Hezbollah is not simply a Lebanese political player, but rather is a regional agent operating on behalf of Iran. Given Hezbollah’s commitment to the destruction of Israel, and its alignment with Iran, any increase in its power in Lebanon is of real concern to Israel. This analysis will look at the Lebanese electoral system, the main players, and the broader implications at stake in the election.

Internal divisions and external forces

The regional division that is shaping Middle East politics is clearly expressed in Lebanon, where the ‘March 14’ bloc of pro-Western parties is contesting a parliamentary election with and the rival ‘March 8’ pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian bloc led by Hezbollah. The March 14 bloc names itself after the date of the 2005 ‘Cedar Revolution’, when hundreds of thousands of Lebanese rallied to protest against Syrian interference in Lebanon, and particularly the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, widely blamed on Syrian elements. The protests led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The March 8 bloc is named for the date of a major pro-Syrian counter-demonstration, led by Hezbollah the same month.

Since then, Lebanon has twice approached civil war between these blocs. In November, 2006, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah sent his activists onto the streets, in an attempt to force the resignation of the March 14-led government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora. The attempt failed. Then, in May 2008, the government made a bold attempt close down Hezbollah’s extensive internal communications network, and to fire the head of security at Rafik Hariri Airport, who is known to report to Hezbollah officials. Hezbollah successfully stopped this attempt by force, seizing control of West Beirut and forcing the government into a humiliating climb-down in subsequent negotiations in Doha.[i] The resulting agreement granted Hezbollah veto power over government decisions, with a blocking third in the Lebanese cabinet.

The situation in Lebanon remains extremely tense. As in the 1970s, Lebanon finds itself a central arena in which the interests of regional rivalries are played out. It is against this background that the election campaign in Lebanon is now commencing. A victory for the Hezbollah-led bloc would constitute a significant advance for the Iran-led regional axis. Hezbollah is not merely a Lebanese player. The movement is a client, and indeed a creation of Iran, which is actively supported by Syria. As such, the movement operates not only or primarily according to an internal Lebanese agenda.

Lebanon‘s confessional electoral system 

Lebanon is unique among Arab countries in having maintained a parliamentary system based on adult suffrage since the country gained independence in 1943. However, Lebanon was racked by civil war from 1975 to 1990, and was then occupied by Syria in the period from 1990 to 2005, and partially by Israel in the period from 1982 to 2000.  Nevertheless, the country possesses an effective framework for representative government, albeit along sectarian lines.

The 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament are elected by universal suffrage for four year terms. But all seats are reserved for candidates representing particular confessional communities within the country, and the balance of seats between the confessional communities is fixed. At present, seats are divided equally between Christians and Muslims (64 for each group), and are then further sub-divided according to sectarian loyalties. Sunni and Shia Muslim communities have 27 seats, Druze 8 and Alawis 2, accounting for the entire ‘Muslim’ half of the parliament. Among the Christians, the large Maronite community has 34 seats, the Greek Orthodox 14, and the remainder is sub-divided among the smaller Christian sects.

The system means that candidates compete only against others of the same confessional origin. So Sunni Muslims living in a predominantly Christian Maronite constituency, for example, will have to choose between rival Christian Maronite candidates. The sectarian breakdown of the country is largely geographical. Shia Muslims predominate in the south, Sunni Muslims in the north, and Christians and Druze also largely concentrated in particular areas. However, because the rival blocs both contain powerful Christian elements, the breakdown of parliamentary seats between the rival blocs does not follow strictly sectarian lines. 

As with the seats in the parliament, the top offices of state are also reserved along sectarian lines. The president must be a Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the parliament a Shia. Under the present arrangement, the position of prime minister holds the most power.   

It is a disputed point as to whether these allocations truly reflect the demographic breakdown of communities in Lebanon. Many believe that the demographic balance of the populations has changed significantly since the last full census was taken in 1932. The claim is made that the Muslim population has increased, making the current allocations not representative. The issue of demography has such sensitive political ramifications in Lebanon that no new population census is likely in the near future.

The real balance of power

In the current Lebanese parliament, the anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian bloc holds 72 seats. It includes the Sunni Tayar al-Mustaqbal movement of Saad Hariri – son of the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri – in alliance with Christian Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, led by Walid Jumblatt, along with some smaller Christian groups. Among their rivals, the Resistance and Development Bloc which combines Hezbollah and its former Shia rivals Amal, has 35 seats. The Free Patriotic Movement of Christian General Michel Aoun meanwhile, who is aligned with the pro-Syrian forces, holds 21 seats.

However the balance of power in the parliament belies the real distribution of power in the country. Critically, Hezbollah maintains its own independent military and security services. It was the use of these forces in 2008 which allowed it to gain veto power over the government. Hezbollah’s independent military capability is the key fact overshadowing Lebanese politics. The movement, with Iranian assistance, has built up what amounts to a parallel state, alongside the official Lebanese institutions. The clashes in May 2008 came about because the government sought to challenge the power of this parallel state. Hezbollah’s independent military capacity, maintained in contravention to UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, and in defiance of a 12,500 strong UN military mission sent to oversee the implementation of those resolutions, overshadows all aspects of life in Lebanon. An example of the effect of this is the interference in foreign media coverage. It is an acknowledged fact among the foreign press corps in Lebanon that parts of the country are off limits except with the permission of Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s media office is known for its intimidating and intrusive monitoring of foreign journalists. [ii]

The high stakes of the election

In the June elections, Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors hope to begin the process of merging Hezbollah’s ‘shadow state’ with the organs of the official Lebanese state. Since June 2008, Hezbollah has exercised veto power over the government. The movement already determines when and how Lebanon goes to war, as was seen in July 2006 when it triggered a major conflict with Israel. Domination of the parliament by the movement and its allies would set the stage for the next phase in this process. However, the success of Hezbollah and its allies in the election is by no means assured. It is clear that the rival blocs are fairly evenly matched and officials of both Hezbollah and March 14 predict a narrow victory for their respective coalitions.

But whatever the electoral result, as things currently stand, no conceivable result will constitute a decisive setback for the Iranian-Syrian regional alliance and its Lebanese clients. In the event of a narrow March 14 victory, the stage would be set for a continuation of the status quo. The events of May 2008 revealed the real power breakdown in the country. Hezbollah may choose to constrain itself in line with its perception of its own interests and those of its patrons. But in the event of its choosing a particular course of action, there is no force – political or military – in Lebanon which is willing or able to stand in its way. That is the case even if the government is officially controlled by Hezbollah’s enemies.

In the event, however, of a success for Hezbollah and its partners in the election, it would also be incorrect to assume that they would then attempt an open seizure of exclusive power. On the contrary, Hezbollah and its allies would try to form a government of national unity, and have said that they would grant veto power over decision-making to the ‘March 14’ bloc, in return for its joining the government. Some have suggested that Hezbollah might even favor Saad Hariri as Prime minister. But this curtain of unity would be used to facilitate the slow and incremental build up of Hezbollah and Iranian power, and the increase of Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs would continue apace. A March 8-led government would make any further governmental challenge to Hezbollah’s independent military capacity unimaginable.

Conclusion: the threat of a Hezbollah victory

What is taking place in Lebanon is a microcosm of the larger state of affairs in the Middle East. It is an integral part of a long-term strategy of Iran to gain regional hegemony through the promotion of a radical ideology and the application of political violence. Should Hezbollah and its allies win the elections, this would mean a major boost in the attempt to build Iranian power on the eastern Mediterranean. A March 8 victory would further blur the distinction between official Lebanon and the Hezbollah para-state, though without ending it entirely. The bright hopes raised for pro-Western forces in the Cedar Revolution of 2005 are currently under threat. The June elections will not finally decide the matter either way, but they are a significant battle in a larger process, of which Lebanon itself is only a small part.

 

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[i]  Nick Blanford, ‘A cell phone civil war in Lebanon’, Time, May 7, 2008.  http://www.time.com

[ii] See Nick Blanford, ‘Our reporter’s night in a Lebanese jail’, Christian Science Monitor, August 1, 2007.  http://www.csmonitor.com