BICOM

Key Points 

• Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has responded to President Barack Obama’s new approach in the region with language aimed to gain recognition and legitimacy from the West, and to ease its diplomatic and economic isolation.  
• The movement is under pressure following its failure to ease restrictions on Gaza, and due to its miscalculation in ending the ceasefire at the end of 2008 which triggered Operation Cast Lead. 
• Whilst both the US and the UK are reconsidering their relations with all players in the region, so far they remain committed to supporting the PA government in the West Bank, and sticking to the Quartet conditions for engagement with Hamas.  
• Despite Hamas’s interest in normalising relations with the West and the international community, as yet it shows no sign of making the changes necessary to meet the Quartet’s conditions.  

Introduction

In an attempt to regain political traction, the Hamas leadership has been adopting a conciliatory tone in recent weeks in its statements about the peace process. The credibility of the movement’s political judgement and military capability was badly damaged by Israel’s military operation at the beginning of the year. Nearly six months on, goods entering Gaza through the border crossings with both Israel and Egypt remain tightly restricted, and no significant reconstruction has taken place. Egypt is currently in the process of taking a much tougher and more determined stand in trying to prevent smuggling through tunnels. With President Barack Obama’s re-launch of US relations with the Islamic world, meanwhile, Hamas is trying to gain legitimacy and recognition.

Hamas’s latest diplomatic offensive

In an interview with the New York Times last month, Khaled Meshaal welcomed the new tone taken by President Obama, and urged people not to view Hamas through the prism of its infamous founding charter, saying: “I promise the American administration and the international community that we will be part of the solution, period.” [i] He reiterated a previously stated position in which he called for a Palestinian state within 1967 borders. But he made clear this would only be part of a long term ceasefire, and only in the context of a full Israeli withdrawal, removal of all settlements, and allowing all Palestinian refugees to return to Israel. This position is clearly not acceptable to Israel.[ii]

Apparently disappointed that his comments did not get more international attention, following Obama’s speech in Cairo two weeks ago, Meshaal made a concerted effort to issue a positive response, even though Obama did not present any real change in the US policy of non-engagement with them. In an interview after the Obama speech, Meshaal said, “I have said I accept a Palestinian state if Israel withdraws to the pre-1967 line. That doesn’t annul the historical fact of the Israeli occupation of 1948, but Hamas and the other factions have all accepted this solution of a Palestinian state at the 1967 line.” But he retained crucial ambiguity about whether this would bring the end of the conflict and recognition of Israel, saying: “That state is our demand today. When our people are free and have their own state they will decide on this position.”[iii] This falls well short of the Quartet conditions, firmly reiterated by Obama in Cairo, of recognising Israel, accepting previous agreements, and renouncing violence.

Hamas’s public statements are in response to the new Obama administration’s policy of extending a hand to the Islamic world. The movement wants the US to adopt the same policy of engagement without preconditions towards it, as it has towards Syria and Iran. In this context it wishes to show its pragmatic face, as a movement defined essentially by their resistance to Israeli occupation, as opposed to a dogmatic, ideological movement defined by hatred of the West and Jews.

Already, however, the difficulties and tensions within Hamas’s position have become apparent. Following Meshaal’s interview with the New York Times, the website of the al-Qassam Brigades, the movement’s armed wing, issued a contradictory statement attributed to Meshaal himself. The statement denied that he had said that the movement had decided to ‘temporarily halt’ the firing of missiles and rockets into Israel. [iv]

In an interview with Arabic  daily Asharq Alawsat, published earlier this month,  Meshaal took a blunter tone. The Hamas leader insisted on Hamas’s right to engage in armed attacks on Israelis, taking issue with Obama’s recommendation that Palestinians follow the example of non-violent struggles of the past. “We in Palestine”, the Hamas leader said, “are under occupation, and the occupation justifies armed resistance according to all treaties and international understandings in all situations throughout history.”[v]

So far, in the case of both Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories, the new US government has continued its policy of staying loyal in its support for pro-Western forces, and not giving a boost to their Islamist rivals by engaging with them. Obama has also made a clear point of rejecting the methodology of violent ‘resistance’ which is a defining feature of both Hamas and Hezbollah.

Hamas’s pressures and dilemmas

Hamas’s immediate goals are to gain recognition and legitimacy from the West, to ease its diplomatic and economic isolation, to lift restrictions on Gaza, and ease the clamp down on its activists in the West Bank at the hands of US trained Palestinian Authority security forces. Operation Cast Lead left Hamas under pressure. The movement’s decision to abandon the ceasefire at the end of 2008 was a miscalculation. It did not succeed in easing the border restrictions and instead triggered a very costly conflict.

The movement was criticised openly in the Arab world, and its military performance fell well short of expectations. A renewed deterrence achieved by Israel through its military operation appears to be one of the major factors behind the fact that since the operation, Hamas have stopped almost completely the firing of rockets and made considerable efforts to prevent other groups from doing so. The movement’s desire to concentrate on re-arming, and the fact that it is engaged in a PR effort to accommodate itself with the US Administration may, of course, also play a role in this. A terror attack launched at the Gaza-Israel border on June 8 was conducted by a separate, smaller faction. 

Since the conflict, Hamas has failed to bring about a significant lifting of the restrictions of its borders either with Israel or with Egypt. There is some pressure from the US and the international community on Israel over this issue, and a meeting of the Israeli security cabinet on June 10 indicated that some limited relaxations of the restrictions may be in the offing. But so far the US has made the clear focus of its pressure on Israel the settlements issue in the West Bank, not the border restrictions in Gaza.

Israel itself continues to see Hamas as part of the Iranian led alliance, alongside Hezbollah and Syria, which poses a severe and ongoing threat to its security. Israel wants to contain Hamas in Gaza by preventing it from rearming or from gaining political capital by taking credit for reconstruction and the lifting of border restrictions. It also wants to avoid any steps that would allow Hamas to extend its control to the West Bank. Israel also continues to link the issue of border restrictions on Gaza to that of kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit.

Egypt had linked the opening of its border with Gaza to the successful conclusion of Palestinian unity talks they have been brokering in Cairo. Those talks have been ongoing for months without showing signs of reaching a resolution. Hamas’s unwillingness to accept the Quartet conditions has been among the major differences between the sides. Egypt, however, is making a real effort to bring these talks to a successful conclusion. Fatah is also understood now to be determined to achieve a renewed unity government, and has just announced the release of Hamas prisoners held in Fatah jails in the West Bank as a major confidence building measure. The latest reports suggest the Egyptian proposal on the table is for a very limited, temporary arrangement to last until elections in January. A joint committee of all the factions would run Gaza, including the reconstruction efforts, and the government of PA President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad would stay in place in the West Bank.[vi] It remains to be seen whether Hamas would contemplate such a deal, which would severely compromise its power base in the Gaza Strip.

The need for reconstruction has made more acute the basic dilemma facing Hamas since they seized power in Gaza in 2007. There can be no normal life for Gaza unless its government can cooperate with on some level with Israel and Egypt. Whilst both countries regard Hamas as an extremely dangerous threat, and the US and the EU continue their policy of non-engagement, the movement has little room for manoeuvre. The best it can manage is to maintain Gaza’s subsistence with basic international aid and smuggling.

Eyewitnesses confirm that currently Hamas rule in Gaza appears stable. The huge smuggling industry, from which the movement also benefits financially, as well as international aid, are preventing the hardship faced by the inhabitants of the Strip developing into an acute humanitarian crisis. Visitors to Gaza also note the efficiency of Hamas’s security forces, and their imposition of authority on the population, in contrast to the sense of uncertainty and chaos in Gaza in the pre-July 2007 period.

But Hamas clearly understands that the situation is far from ideal. Normalising relations with the West would put pressure on Israel to ease its restrictions and undermine the position of its Fatah rivals. Though development in the West Bank under the rival Abbas-Fayyad government is limited, the situation there contrasts starkly with Gaza. The West Bank is experiencing economic growth, greater security, improving freedom of movement, higher employment, and the promise of major development projects. But at the present time, the new language employed by Hamas leaders falls short of what would be needed to achieve the changes it desires – namely, open engagement of the US and EU with Hamas and its Gaza enclave.

Conclusion

Hamas’s latest public relations offensive, and its nuanced language regarding the peace process, are part of a concerted effort to show a pragmatic face to the US and EU, as an organisation that they can do business with. But whilst there may be some changes in the tone of their statements, they are still falling short of Quartet conditions, and neither the US nor the EU looks ready to relax the rules. Whilst behind the scenes efforts to test out Hamas’s intentions cannot be ruled out, so far the US policy of ‘extending a hand’ has not been applied to Hamas, and the firm commitment to supporting the PA government of Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad does not look likely to change. Some pressure on Israel to ease the restrictions on goods entering Gaza, including building materials to aid reconstruction, may be a way of keeping the Gaza issue under control, especially if some form of limited unity government can be established there. But the main US focus looks set to be a more substantial peace process with Abbas-Fayyad government in the West Bank. 

Khaled Meshaal thus faces difficult choices, and the Hamas leader spoke frankly of the current ‘difficult period’ in his interview with Asharq Alawsat. He said, however, that the movement would not abandon its ‘rights’, and expressed his confidence that Hamas would ‘impose its view.’[vii] Such statements suggest that no major softening of Hamas’s positions is currently taking place, of the type that would meet the conditions for engagement that the US and EU have applied until now.

 

 

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[i]  Tagreed el-Khodary and Ethan Bronner, “Addressing US, Hamas says it grounded rockets,” New York Times, 4/5/09.  http://www.nytimes.com

[ii]  Meshaal’s growing international prominence, when compared with the relative silence of the Hamas’s Gaza leadership in recent months is noteworthy. Meshaal is not a dictator within Hamas, but there is a clear sense that his authority as head of the movement’s external leadership and overall leader of the movement is accepted.  

[iii] Helena Cobban, “Hamas leader to Obama: deeds, not words,” Inter Press Service, 5/6/09. http://ipsnews.net

[iv] “Qassam website: New York Times Mashal report incorrect,” International Middle East Media Center, May 6, 2009. http://www.imemc.org

[v]   “Meshaal: We are in a difficult period and we will impose our view,” Asharq Alawsat (Arabic), June 11, 2009.  Translation: author. 

[vi] “PA to release Hamas prisoners in unity gesture”, Avi Issachoroff, Haaretz, June 23, 2009

[vii]  Asharq Alawsat.