BICOM

Over the past weeks, the Israeli security forces have struck hard in Gaza at elements involved in the launching of Qassam attacks on Israeli communities in the western Negev.  The IDF has killed around 20 militants of the Islamic Jihad in recent days.[i] There have been no Israeli fatalities, and no Palestinian civilian deaths in these operations. At the same time, the Qassam attacks continue, and there are no indications that military activity on the current level is likely to lead to a permanent solution to this problem.

Apparently as a result of the renewed military pressure on the Hamas-led Gaza Strip, there are now reports that Hamas has renewed its interest in the possibility of a renewed ceasefire (Hudna), or a short period of calm (Tahdiyeh) between the organization and Israel. Reports in the al-Quds and Sharq al-Awsat newspapers over the weekend suggested this.[ii] No formal offer of such a ceasefire has been made, however, and the government of Israel yesterday re-affirmed its position that Hamas must conform to the demands of the Quartet regarding the recognition of Israel, cessation of violence and adherence to existing agreements before contacts can take place.[iii] This article will examine the possible policy options facing Israel regarding the ongoing problematic situation in Gaza.

Israel is faced with a number of possible options vis-à-vis Gaza:

The first option would involve continuing military operations at somewhere close to the current level, while exploring the possibility of reaching a Hudna, or a period of calm, during which Hamas’s ability and willingness to force Islamic Jihad and other groups to cease the firing of Qassams would be put to the test. There are voices within Israel who have called for seeking to engage Hamas – including former Mossad Head Efraim Halevy. Recent remarks by Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz also suggested the possibility of establishing mediated contact between Israel and Hamas. Israel is unlikely to adopt this course of action, because it would mean the granting of an important concession to Hamas – namely bringing the movement into a de facto political process with Israel, (and ceasing the current military pressure on Gaza if Hamas committed to a Hudna) – in return for a Hamas commitment to act against Qassam launchers which might not be undertaken, or not undertaken wholeheartedly. Moreover the time granted by the process may well be used by Hamas and other militants in the Gaza Strip to rest and re-build.

In addition to the question of whether Hamas would prove willing to undertake the task of bringing an end to the Qassam fire, there is an additional question regarding the group’s ability to do so in the first place. Islamic Jihad is not answerable to Hamas, and it is as yet hard to imagine Hamas employing forceful methods against Palestinians wishing to engage in violent activity against Israelis. Hamas is also said to be internally divided regarding the whole issue of a ceasefire. Ismail Haniyeh and overall movement leader Khaled Mashaal are said to favour a temporary ceasefire, while Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar and Sayed Siam are said to be opposed. Ahmed al-Jabari, who commands the Izz a-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza, is also understood to be opposed to a ceasefire, which raises the question of whether Hamas would prove able to impose such a decision even on its own men.[iv]

The second option available to Israel, which the latest indications suggest is the preferred option of the Israeli government, is to continue and where necessary escalate the current campaign of military pressure on Gaza, making every effort to neutralize the Qassams, while maintaining the existing conditions for Hamas to enter the political process. This option has the potential disadvantage that the continuing and expansion of operations brings with it the increased likelihood that eventually the toll on Palestinian civilians may increase, leading to international pressure on Israel to desist. But Israeli policymakers believe that the confused overtures from Hamas regarding a possible ceasefire received over the weekend indicate that the Hamas rulers of Gaza are under pressure as a result of the latest Israeli action, and that it would be a mistake therefore at this stage to step back.[v] The hope is that the maintenance of pressure, military and economic, at something like the current level, will lead to Hamas seeking to rein in or at least limit the Qassam-launching elements, with no granting of legitimacy to (or recognition of) the organization on Israel’s part

At the weekly Cabinet meeting on Sunday, Prime Minister Olmert spoke of reducing the number of Qassam attacks to the ‘unavoidable minimum,’ and stated that counter-terrorist operations would continue ‘as they have for months.'[vi] At the same time, the Prime Minister stressed Israel’s rejection of any political process involving Hamas for as long as it continues to reject the Quartet’s conditions. The Prime Minister is known to regard Israel’s success at maintaining a united international stance regarding the requirement that Hamas conform to the three Quartet conditions as a significant diplomatic achievement. There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that Israel is about to unilaterally depart from this consensus.

The third possible option available to Israel would be a major military operation in the Gaza Strip, along the lines of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, which would be intended to destroy Hamas’s rule in the Strip. One advantage of such a course of action would be that for as long as the independent Hamas authority exists in Gaza, it is difficult to see how significant progress can be made in the diplomatic process between Israel and the PA. Such an operation would also give the IDF and security services free rein to seek out and destroy the infrastructure of the production and delivery of the Qassam rockets. Within the government, Strategic Affairs Minister Avigdor Lieberman is known to favour a military operation of far broader dimensions, which would include the re-imposition of Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor separating Gaza from Sinai. However, the potential disadvantages of such an operation are manifold. It would be likely to exact a heavy cost in the lives of IDF soldiers, as Hamas and its allies fought for the survival of their regime. It is also not at all certain what would follow – and whether an imposed Fatah regime in Gaza would survive, or whether the IDF would need to remain deployed in the Strip over a longer term. The possibility of an operation of this type certainly exists, but it is unlikely to be carried out unless the dimensions of the terrorist threat emanating from Gaza significantly change. If, for example, a successful mass terror attack were to be perpetrated on Israeli civilians by a cell emanating from Gaza, then this option might come onto the agenda. But under the present conditions, this option is likely to be held in reserve.

The latest indications suggest that option two is the preferred position of the government of Israel. Over the weekend, as a result of a number of reports in the Arabic language press, there were rumours of an imminent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas-ruled Gaza. The latest statements emerging from the Cabinet have served to refute such rumours, however.  Israel is under no international pressure to engage with Hamas, or to desist from operations against Qassam launching cells. These operations have so far met with some success, and with public approval. It is likely therefore, that the weeks ahead will see a continuing, and perhaps a broadening of these operations, along with a maintaining of the current stance rejecting any political process with Hamas, for as long as it refuses to conform to the international consensus regarding recognition of Israel, abandoning violence and committing to existing agreements.

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[i] Ron Bousso, ‘Israel rules out Hamas talks amid Gaza ‘War’, Agence France Presse, 23 December 2007. http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20071223/wl_mideast_afp/mideastconflictgazaisrael_071223111709 

[ii] Amos Harel, ‘Haniyeh advisor: Hamas willing to discuss truce with Israel,’ Haaretz, 23 December 2007. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/937060.html

[iii] Cabinet Communique, Government Press Office, 23 December 2007.

[iv] Amos Harel, ‘One Qassam too many,’ Haaretz, 21 December 2007. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/936852.html

[v] Dan Murphy, ‘Under Pressure, Hamas offers Israel Truce talks,’ Christian Science Monitor, 19 December 2007. http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1219/p99s01-duts.html

[vi] Cabinet Communiqué.